Civil Rights Cases (1883)

Facts of the Case: The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act.

Question: Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violate the 10th Amendment of the Constitution which reserves all powers not granted to the national government to the states or to the people?

Conclusion: The Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action. And the fifth section of the Amendment empowers Congress only to enforce the prohibition on state action. The amendment did not authorize national legislation on subjects which are within the domain of the state. Private acts of racial discrimination were simply private wrongs that the national government was powerless to correct.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Facts of the Case: The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.

Question: Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either."

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

Facts of the Case: An 1880 ordinance of the city of San Francisco required all laundries in wooden buildings to hold a permit issued by the city's Board of Supervisors. The board had total discretion over who would be issued a permit. Although workers of Chinese descent operated 89 percent of the city's laundry businesses, not a single Chinese owner was granted a permit. Yick Wo and Wo Lee each operated laundry businesses without a permit and, after refusing to pay a $10 fine, were imprisoned by the city's sheriff, Peter Hopkins. Each sued for writ of habeas corpus, arguing the fine and discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Noting that, on its face, the law is nondiscriminatory, the Supreme Court of California and the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California denied claims for Yick Wo and Wo Lee, respectively.

Question: Did the unequal enforcement of the city ordinance violate Yick Wo and Wo Lee's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice T. Stanley Matthews, the Court concluded that, despite the impartial wording of the law, its biased enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause. According to the Court, even if the law is impartial on its face, "if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." The kind of biased enforcement experienced by the plaintiffs, the Court concluded, amounted to "a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the law" and therefore violated the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1896)

Facts of the Case: The Chinese Exclusion Acts denied citizenship to Chinese immigrants. Moreover, by treaty no Chinese subject in the US could become a naturalized citizen. Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco. At age 21, he returned to China to visit his parents who had previously resided in the United States for 20 years. When he returned to the United States, Wong was denied entry on the ground that he was not a citizen.

Question: Could the government deny naturalization to persons born in the United States in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: No. The government could not deny naturalization to anyone born in the United States. To reach this conclusion, Justice Gray's tedious majority opinion managed to traverse much of western civilization.

United States v. E.C. Knight Co. (1895)

Facts of the Case: The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant combinations controlling tranportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States.

Question: Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?

Conclusion: The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly."

Swift & Co. v. United States (1905)

Facts of the Case: A "meat trust" developed in Chicago, in which major dealers of meat agreed not to bid against one another in order to control prices. The trust also pressured the railroads into charging them lower-than-normal rates. The U.S. government attacked the trust as an unlawful economic monopoly.

Question: Did Congress have the authority to regulate the meat trust under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?

Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that congressional power under the Commerce Clause justified regulations of the meat trust. The Court held that the effect of the trust on commerce among states was not "accidental, secondary, remote or merely probable," but rather a direct attempt to monopolize commerce. Business done at the stockyards was found to be one part of a continuous stream of commerce. The Court drew a distinction between manufacturing monopolies, which had only indirect effects on commerce, and sales monopolies, which had direct and intended effects on commerce.

Lochner v. New York (1905)

Facts of the Case: The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day.

Question:  Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law; the state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor.

Muller v. Oregon (1908)

Facts of the Case: Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries.

Question: Does the Oregon law violate a woman's freedom of contract implicit in the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: There was no constitutional violation. The factory and laundry owners claimed that there was no reasonable connection between the law and public health, safety, or welfare. In a famous brief in defense of the Oregon law, attorney Louis Brandeis elaborately detailed expert reports on the harmful physical, economic and social effects of long working hours on women. Brewer's opinion was based on the proposition that physical and social differences between the sexes warranted a different rule respecting labor contracts. Theretofore, gender was not a basis for such distinctions. Brewer's opinion conveyed the accepted wisdom of the day: that women were unequal and inferior to men.

Bunting v. Oregon (1917)

Facts of the Case:  A 1913 state law prescribed a 10-hour day for men and women, expanding the law regulating women's hours upheld in Muller v. Oregon. The measure also required time-and-a-half wages for overtime up to 3 hours a day. The State asserted that the law was an appropriate exercise of its police powers. Bunting failed to comply with the overtime regulations of the statute.

Question: Did the law interfere with liberty of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: The Court upheld the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and found the law constitutional. Relying on the justifications made by the Oregon court and legislature, Justice McKenna dismissed Bunting's contention that the law did nothing to preserve the health of employees. The Court found that the law did not provide an unfair advantage to certain types of employers in the labor market since it regulated the hours of service for workers and not the wages that they earned. Under the Oregon statute, workers and their employers were still free to implement a wage scheme which was agreeable to both of them.

Standard Oil Co. of NJ v. United States (1911)

Facts of the Case: John D. Rockefeller owned the largest and richest trust in America. He controlled the nation's oil business and scorned congressional efforts to outlaw combinations in restraint of trade (i.e., antitrust). In 1909, a federal court found Rockefeller's company, Standard Oil, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court ordered the dissolution of the company.

Question: Did Standard Oil violate the Sherman Act?

Conclusion: Standard Oil lost, but White, for the majority, managed to amend the language of the Sherman Act such that only "unreasonable" contracts and combinations in restraint of trade would violate the law. Heretofore, the Act made all contracts and combinations in restraint of trade into law violations. In this case, the record shows that the Standard Oil trust was unreasonable.

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)

Facts of the Case: The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.

Question: Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion: Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government.

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922)

Facts of the Case: As an exercise of its taxing powers Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1919, also called the Child Labor Tax Law. Under the law, companies employing children under fourteen years of age would be assessed ten percent of their annual profits. During the same year in which the act was passed, Drexel Furniture Company was found in violation of it and required to pay over $6000 in taxes, which it did under protest.

Question: Did Congress violate the Constitution in adopting the Child Labor Tax Law in attempting to regulate the employment of children, a power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes. The Court found that the Child Labor Tax Law was in violation of the Constitution as it intruded on the jurisdiction of states to adopt and enforce child labor codes. Chief Justice Taft argued that the tax law in question did much more than simply impose an "incidental restraint" but exerted a "prohibitory and regulatory effect" in a realm over which Congress had no jurisdiction. Taft feared that upholding this law would destroy state sovereignty and devastate "all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress" by allowing it to disguise future regulatory legislation in the cloak of taxes.

Debs v. United States (1919)

Facts of the Case: The Espionage Act of 1917 made it a crime to "convey information with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the armed forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies." This had the effect of constraining sedition and political speech. On June 16, 1918, Eugene V. Debs, a leader of the Socialist Party of America, gave a speech in Canton, Ohio protesting involvement in World War I. During the speech, he discussed the rise of socialism and specifically praised individuals who had refused to serve in the military and obstructed military recruiting. For his speech, Debs was arrested and charged with violating the Espionage Act. At trial, Debs argued the Espionage Act violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. A federal district court rejected his claim and sentenced Debs to ten years in prison.

Question: Did Debs' conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 violate his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech?

Conclusion: No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court found that Debs' case was clearly similar to Schenck v. United States (1919). In Schenck , the Court had concluded that the arrest of an individual for distributing leaflets encouraging readers to oppose the draft was constitutional. The Court found Debs' sympathy for individuals convicted of opposing the draft and obstructing recruitment analogous to the situation in Schenck . Thus, Debs' conviction was upheld.

Schenck v. United States (1919)

Facts of the Case: During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment.

Question: Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion: Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.

Abrams v. United States (1919)

Facts of the Case: The defendants were convicted on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from windows of a building. One leaflet signed "revolutionists" denounced the sending of American troops to Russia. The second leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and US efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. The defendants were charged and convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of production of essential war material. They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Question: Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion: No and no. The act's amendments are constitutional and the defendants' convictions are affirmed. In Clarke's majority opinion, the leaflets are an appeal to violent revolution, a call for a general strike, and an attempt to curtail production of munitions. The leaflets had a tendency to encourage war resistance and to curtail war production. Holmes and Brandeis dissented on narrow ground: the necessary intent had not been shown. These views were to become a classic libertarian pronouncement.

Facts of the Case: Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under a state criminal anarchy law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterences without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The New York courts had decided that anyone who advocated the doctrine of violent revolution violated the law.

Question: Does the New York law punishing the advocacy of overthrowing the government an unconstitutional violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion: Threshold issue: Does the First Amendment apply to the states? Yes, by virtue of the liberty protected by due process clause of the 14th Amendment. On the merits, a state may forbid both speech and publication if they have a tendency to result in action dangerous to public security, even though such utterances create no clear and present danger. The rationale of the majority has sometimes been called the "dangerous tendency" test. The legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those legislative decisions will be upheld if not unreasonable, and the defendant will be punished even if her speech created no danger at all.

Whitney v. California (1927)

Facts of the Case: Charlotte Anita Whitney, a member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under that state's Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime, including "terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership. . .or effecting any political change.

Question: Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court argued "that a State. . .may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances. . .tending to. . .endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means" and was not open to question. The decision is most notable for the concurring opinion written by Justice Brandeis, in which he argued that only clear, present, and imminent threats of "serious evils" could justify suppression of speech.

De Jonge v. Oregon (1937)

Facts of the Case:  On July 27, 1934, at a meeting held by the Communist Party, Dirk De Jonge addressed the audience regarding jail conditions in the county and a maritime strike in progress in Portland. While the meeting was in progress, police raided it. De Jonge was arrested and charged with violating the State's criminal syndicalism statute. The law defines criminal syndicalism as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution." After being convicted, De Jonge moved for an acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to warrant his conviction. Disagreeing, the State Supreme Court distinguished that the indictment did not charge De Jonge with criminal syndicalism, but rather that he presided at, conducted and assisted in conducting an assemblage of persons, organization, society and group called by the Communist Party, which was unlawfully teaching and advocating in Multnomah county the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage.

Question: Does Oregon's criminal syndicalism statute violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes, the Court held that the Oregon statute, as applied, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the record, the Court determined that De Jonge's sole offense was assisting in a public meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court reasoned that to preserve the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly - principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment - not the auspices under which a meeting is held, but the purpose of the meeting and whether the speakers' remarks transcend the bounds of freedom of speech must be examined, which had not occurred in De Jonge's case. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

Facts of the Case: Nebraska, along with other states, prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages to grade school children. Meyer, who taught German in a Lutheran school, was convicted under this law.

Question: Does the Nebraska statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause?

Conclusion: Yes, the Nebraska law is unconstitutional. Nebraska violated the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty means more than freedom from bodily restraint. State regulation of liberty must be reasonably related to a proper state objective. The legislature's view of reasonableness was subject to supervision by the courts. The legislative purpose of the law was to promote assimilation and civic development. But these purposes were not adequate to justify interfering with Meyer's liberty to teach or the liberty of parents to employ him during a "time of peace and domestic tranquillity."

Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

Facts of the Case: The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Society of Sisters v. Hill Military Academy.

Question: Did the Act violate the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children?

Conclusion: Yes. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."

Hocutt v. Wilson (1933) | overview

Summary: First test case involving segregation in higher education.

State of Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938) | overview

Summary: First decision establishing minimum content for equality within the Separate but equal doctrine.

Alston v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia (1940 4th Circuit) | overview

Summary: Teacher pay-equalization case from Virginia.

Overview of the Topic | Literacy tests | Poll Tax | Grandfather clause

Williams v. Mississippi (1898) | overview

Summary: Reviewed provisions of the state constitution that required poll taxes and a literacy test for voting; found no discrimination since these requirements were applied to all voters.

Guinn v. United States (1915) | overview | website |

Summary: Found grandfather clause exemptions to literacy tests to be unconstitutional. Also consider Lane v. Wilson (1939).

Breedlove v. Suttles (1937) | overview

Summary: Upheld Georgia's annual poll tax.

Nixon v. Herndon (1927) | overview | overview2

Summary: Overturned a Texas statute prohibiting African Americans from participating in Democratic Party primary elections.

Nixon v. Condon (1932) | overview

Summary: Ruled that a recent Texas law delegating state power to the executive committee of the Democratic Party, which in turn bared African Americans from voting in primary elections, was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Grovey v. Townsend (1935) | overview

Summary: Upheld the Texas Democratic Party's resolution adopted in 1932 that only white Democrats could vote in primaries.

Smith v. Allwright (1944) | overview

Summary: Overturned the Democratic Party's use of all-white primaries in Texas and other states.

Powell v. Alabama (1932) | overview

Summary: Ruled that in a defendant in a capital trial must be given access to counsel upon his or her request as part of due process.

Norris v. Alabama (1935) | overview

Summary: Ruled that organized exclusion of blacks from jury panels was a violation of a defendants' constitutional right to due process.

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935)

Facts of the Case: Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act empowered the President to implement industrial codes to regulate weekly employment hours, wages, and minimum ages of employees. The codes had standing as penal statutes.

Question: Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President?

Conclusion: The Court held that Section 3 was "without precedent" and violated the Constitution. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity. In other words, it did not make codes, but simply empowered the President to do so. A unanimous Court found this to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

Morehead v. New York (1936)

Facts of the Case: A New York minimum wage law empowered the state labor commission to fix wages in relation to the class of service rendered. This fixing of wages in relation to value was an attempt to satisfy the Supreme Court's narrow view of minimum wage legislation.

Question: Does the law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes, the law is unconstitutional. The right of employers and employees to make contracts for wages in return for work "is part of the liberty protected by the due process clause." The state could not interfere with such contracts. The decision was so at odds with current thinking that national conventions of both political parties explicitly called for its repudiation. Within a year, the Court took a dramatic reversal of course.

Carter v. Carter Coal Company (1936)

Facts of the Case: In 1935, Congress enacted the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, also known as the Guffey Coal Act. The Act regulated prices, minimum wages, maximum hours, and "fair practices" of the coal industry. Although compliance was voluntary, tax refunds were established as incentives to abide by the regulations. Carter, a stockholder, brought suit against his own company in an attempt to keep it from paying the tax for noncompliance. This case was decided together with R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Clark, R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, and Halvering v. Carter.

Question: Did the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 exceed congressional powers under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion: In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that the 1935 Act overstepped the bounds of congressional power. The Court ruled that "commerce" is plainly distinct from "production." Employing workers, setting wages and working hours, and mining coal were found to be part of the local process of production, separate from any trade of goods that could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. In striking down the law, Justice Sutherland argued that "[e]verything which moves in interstate commerce has had a local origin. Without local production somewhere, interstate commerce. . . would practically disappear."

United States v. Butler (1936)

Facts of the Case: As part of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under.

Question: Did Congress exceed its constitutional taxing and spending powers with the Act?

Conclusion: The Court found the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Even though Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, argued Justice Roberts, in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end," and violated the Tenth Amendment.

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937)

Facts of the Case: With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Congress determined that labor- management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. In this case, the National Labor Relations Board charged the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. with discriminating against employees who were union members.

Question: Was the Act consistent with the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion: Yes. The Court held that the Act was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The justices abandoned their claim that labor relations had only an indirect effect on commerce. Since the ability of employees to engage in collective bargaining (one activity protected by the Act) is "an essential condition of industrial peace," the national government was justified in penalizing corporations engaging in interstate commerce which "refuse to confer and negotiate" with their workers.

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)

Facts of the Case: Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received sub- minimum wage compensation for her work. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law.

Question: Did the minimum wage law violate the liberty of contract as construed under the Fifth Amendment as applied by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutionally legitimate. The Court noted that the Constitution did not speak of the freedom of contract and that liberty was subject to the restraints of due process. The Court also noted that employers and employees were not equally "free" in negotiating contracts, since employees often were constrained by practical and economic realities. This was found to be especially true in the case of women. This case explicitly overruled the Court's decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923).

Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)

Facts of the Case: Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses; they believed that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by Biblical commands.

Question: Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion: No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court declined to make itself "the school board for the country" and upheld the mandatory flag salute. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values" and that national unity was "the basis of national security." The flag, the Court found, was an important symbol of national unity and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed "to promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country."

West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette (1943)

Facts of the Case: The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program of activities in all public schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the Flag; refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and charges of delinquency.

Question: Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion: In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. The Court found that such a salute was a form of utterance and was a means of communicating ideas. "Compulsory unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to failure and was antithetical to First Amendment values. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson argued that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."

Cantwell v. State of Connecticut (1940)

Facts of the Case: Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. The Cantwells distributed religious materials by travelling door-to-door and by approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman Catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequently arrested for violating a local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of the peace.

Question: Did the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise rights?

Conclusion: Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not entail any threat of "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.

Martin v. Struthers (1943)

Facts of the Case: Martin was a Jehovah's Witness in Struthers, Ohio. She canvassed neighborhoods knocking on doors and ringing doorbells to distribute leaflets promoting a meeting. She was convicted and fined $10 for violating a city ordinance that prohibited a person who was distributing leaflets and other flyers from knocking on doors and ringing doorbells. She appealed her conviction in the Circuit Court of Mahoning County, alleging that the city ordinance violated her First Amendment free speech and free press rights. The Circuit Court upheld the ordinance and her conviction. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed her appeal.

Question: Did the city ordinance prohibiting the ringing of doorbells and knocking on doors by a person distributing promotional materials violate the free speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio and held Struthers' ordinance unconstitutional. In the majority opinion written by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court acknowledged the city's interest in preventing crime and reducing nuisances. However, alternative solutions, such as trespassing laws, were also available that could achieve the city's purpose. Activities like Martin's were "so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved." The ordinance was overly restrictive on door-to-door distributors, and therefore unconstitutional.

Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943)

Facts of the Case: The Borough of Jeannette, Pennsylvania mandated that all solicitors that sold goods within the borough purchase a solicitation license. Robert Murdock was a Jehovah's Witness who canvassed door to door within Jeannette, offering religious texts in exchange for donations. He and other Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested for their solicitation of their texts. They were convicted and fined for violating Jeannette's ordinance. The Jehovah's Witnesses appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, alleging that the ordinance violated the Free Speech, Free Press, and Free Exercise of Religion clauses of the First Amendment. The Superior Court upheld the ordinance and their convictions, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to hear their appeal.

Question: Did Jeannette's ordinance violate the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Religion clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion: Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and held the ordinance unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice William O. Douglas characterized the Jehovah's Witnesses' activities in the borough as "more than preaching" and "more than distribution of religious literature." Their door-to-door activities, though unconventional, "occupie[d] the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits." The Court recognized the need of the Jehovah's Witnesses to sustain themselves. Though the organization solicited donations in their distribution of literature, "freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." While the borough did have an interest in preserving the public peace, the Jehovah's Witnesses were soliciting "peacefully and quietly." The ordinance did not further the borough's interest in restricting the activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses, and was therefore unconstitutional.

Hirabayashi v. United States (1943)

Facts of the Case: In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to prevent incidents of subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese descent living in the United States. He issued two executive orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of War the power to designate certain parts of the country "military areas" and exclude certain persons from them. The second established the War Relocation Authority which had the power to remove, maintain, and supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order.

Question: Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion: The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry."

Korematsu v. United States (1944)

Facts of the Case: During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.

Question: Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent?

Conclusion: The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril."